A mid-sized manufacturing firm with operations spanning production floors, remote engineering teams, and third-party supplier integrations had never undergone a formal security review. Concerned about their growing exposure to cyber threats and upcoming regulatory scrutiny, the business engaged Verdas to conduct a comprehensive security audit — including external and internal penetration testing, a full review of their on-premise and cloud application estate, and a prioritised remediation roadmap for the entire IT team.
The business had grown steadily over the previous five years — adding remote engineering staff, integrating supplier portals, migrating some systems to cloud while keeping others on-premise, and deploying line-of-business applications without a formal procurement or security review process. The result was an environment that the internal IT team managed reactively, with no clear inventory of what was exposed to the internet and no assurance over what was actually patched or hardened.
Following a spate of ransomware attacks on UK manufacturers reported in trade press, the board requested a formal independent security assessment. The IT manager had a strong operational instinct but lacked the specialist resources to conduct penetration testing or evaluate the security posture of the application stack objectively.
Verdas structured the engagement in four phases — passive reconnaissance and asset discovery, external penetration testing, internal network and application assessment, and finally a full written remediation report with a prioritised action plan presented directly to the IT team and board. All testing was conducted under a formal scope-of-work agreement and rules of engagement, with the IT manager briefed daily on any critical findings as they were discovered.
Open-source intelligence (OSINT) gathering performed against the organisation's public internet footprint — enumerating exposed IP ranges, subdomains, certificate transparency records, public code repositories, and leaked credential databases. The asset discovery phase identified several services exposed to the internet that the IT team were unaware were publicly reachable, including an unpatched remote management interface and a staging web application containing internal data.
Full black-box external penetration test conducted against all internet-facing assets within the agreed scope. Testing methodology followed OWASP and PTES frameworks. Automated vulnerability scanning combined with manual exploitation attempts. Four critical vulnerabilities identified and verified — including an unauthenticated remote code execution path on an exposed web service, and a misconfigured VPN gateway accepting legacy authentication protocols. All critical findings escalated to the IT manager immediately on discovery per the rules of engagement.
Onsite internal assessment conducted across both the corporate IT network and the production floor OT network segment. Network architecture reviewed, firewall rule sets audited, and Active Directory configuration examined for privilege escalation paths, stale accounts, and insecure delegation settings. Line-of-business and supplier-facing applications assessed for authentication weaknesses, access control failures, and injection vulnerabilities. Supplier VPN access reviewed — network segments found to be far broader than operationally necessary.
Full written security assessment report produced — covering all 23 findings, each documented with severity rating, detailed technical description, evidence, business risk context, and specific remediation guidance. Findings categorised by severity (Critical, High, Medium, Low) and mapped to a prioritised remediation roadmap with estimated effort and owner assignment. Report presented to the IT team in a structured walkthrough session, followed by a board-level executive summary covering business risk and investment required. Verdas remained available for remediation support queries for 30 days post-delivery.
The following findings represent a selection of issues uncovered across the external and internal testing phases. All findings were responsibly disclosed to the client before any public reference, and all critical and high severity issues have since been fully remediated.
An internet-facing legacy web application used for supplier order submissions was found to be running an unpatched version of its underlying framework containing a publicly known RCE vulnerability. Successful exploitation was demonstrated in a controlled manner, confirming an attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the underlying server without any authentication. The service had not appeared in the IT team's asset inventory as an internet-facing system.
The primary remote access VPN was configured to accept NTLMv1 authentication — a protocol deprecated due to well-documented weaknesses allowing offline password cracking from captured challenge-response pairs. Combined with several domain accounts found in leaked credential databases during the OSINT phase, this represented a realistic path to initial network access without any valid credentials.
Third-party supplier accounts connecting via VPN were granted network access to a far broader range of internal segments than their operational function required — including file servers and internal management interfaces. A compromise of a supplier's credentials would provide an attacker with direct access to internal systems without any further exploitation required.
Kerberos delegation settings on several service accounts allowed unconstrained delegation — enabling a low-privilege domain account to potentially impersonate any user, including Domain Admins, under certain conditions. Multiple stale privileged accounts belonging to former employees were also identified with no expiry date and passwords unchanged in over four years.
An internal production scheduling application was found to have insufficient access controls — authenticated users could access and modify records belonging to other departments by manipulating URL parameters. No server-side authorisation check was performed to verify the requesting user's entitlement to the accessed resource.
Following the assessment, Verdas delivered a full written security recommendations report structured around three time horizons — immediate actions required within 72 hours, short-term hardening over the following 30 days, and a strategic roadmap for building sustained security maturity. Each recommendation included the assigned owner, estimated effort, and the specific technical steps required to resolve or mitigate the finding.
Emergency patch applied to the exposed web service with the RCE vulnerability. Service taken offline for patching within hours of critical finding disclosure. VPN gateway reconfigured to disable NTLMv1 authentication. All stale privileged Active Directory accounts disabled and flagged for review. Supplier VPN access scoped down to minimum required network segments.
Multi-factor authentication mandated on all remote access, VPN, admin accounts, and cloud services. Conditional access policies implemented preventing authentication from unmanaged devices. Privileged Access Workstation policy recommended for Domain Admin accounts. Kerberos delegation settings reviewed and constrained delegation applied where delegation was genuinely required.
Full firewall rule audit conducted — 47 redundant or overpermissive rules removed. Internet-exposed services reduced to the minimum operationally required. Production OT network formally segmented from the corporate IT network with controlled, audited crossing points. Supplier access restricted to dedicated, monitored network zones with no access to internal infrastructure.
Formal asset register created covering all internet-facing and internal systems with patch status, owner, and review cadence. Vulnerability scanning scheduled monthly against the full asset register. Access control findings in the line-of-business application escalated to the vendor with a detailed technical write-up. Patch management policy documented and approved by management with defined SLAs for critical patches.
Staff security awareness training programme recommended and scoped — covering phishing recognition, password hygiene, safe remote working practices, and incident reporting procedures. Simulated phishing exercises recommended on a quarterly basis to establish a baseline and measure improvement. IT team briefed on findings as a learning exercise to build internal security knowledge.
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) deployment scoped and recommended to provide centralised log aggregation and alerting. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint recommended for endpoint detection across the estate. Annual penetration test scheduled as a recurring engagement to track remediation progress and identify new vulnerabilities introduced as the environment evolves.
| Area | Before the Audit | After Remediation |
|---|---|---|
| Asset Inventory | No formal register — unknown internet exposure | Full documented asset register with patch status and owner |
| Remote Access | VPN accepting legacy auth, no MFA on admin accounts | MFA enforced on all remote access and admin accounts |
| Patch Management | Reactive — no defined SLA or vulnerability scanning | Monthly scanning, defined patch SLAs, documented policy |
| Firewall Rules | Unreviewed for 3+ years — 47 redundant rules | Full audit complete — minimised and documented ruleset |
| Supplier Access | Broad network access with no segmentation | Restricted to dedicated zones — no internal infrastructure access |
| Active Directory | Stale accounts, unconstrained delegation, no review cycle | Stale accounts disabled, delegation constrained, review cadence set |
| Security Awareness | No formal training programme — years without a session | Annual training programme and quarterly phishing simulations |
| Board Visibility | No security reporting to management or board | Executive summary delivered — security risk on board agenda |
Within 72 hours of the critical findings being disclosed, the most dangerous vulnerabilities were patched or mitigated. Over the following six weeks, the IT team worked through the full remediation roadmap with Verdas available for technical queries throughout. By the end of the engagement, every critical and high severity finding had been fully resolved, a formal patch management policy was in place, MFA was enforced across all remote access, and the board had a clear view of the organisation's security posture for the first time.
"We knew we had gaps but we didn't know where or how serious they were. Verdas found things we genuinely didn't know existed — systems exposed to the internet that weren't even on our radar. The report was clear, the remediation guidance was practical, and they walked the team through everything rather than just handing over a document. We went from not knowing our exposure to having a plan we could actually execute."
— IT Manager, Manufacturing BusinessWe'll audit your environment, test your defences, and give your team a clear remediation roadmap — before an attacker finds them first.
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